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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLEARFIELD STATE BANK, / 
Plaintiff and / 
Appellant/ 
/ 
vs. Case No. 14521 
/ 
J. G. CONTOS, a/k/a 
JAMES G. CONTOS, / 
Defendant and / 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by the Appellant against 
the Respondent seeking an Order of the Court for possession 
of merchandise allegedly secured to the Plaintiff on the basis 
of a secured transaction entered into by the Respondent only, 
and which secured transaction was not subscribed to by the 
wife of the Respondent and wherein the wife at all times has 
been in possession of the secured collateral and has not acquiesced 
to the transaction as between the Respondent and the Appellant 
in entering into a security agreement. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Upon a hearing held in the Lower Court before the 
Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, the Court held that the Respondent's 
wife was not a party to the contract nor to the action before 
the Lower Court and that the Court could not deprive the wife 
of the Respondent of possession of property which she owns 
and thereby decreeing a Judgment of no cause of action as 
to the claim of the Appellant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the Judgment of 
the Lower Court denying to the Appellant the right to deprive 
the wife of possession and ownership of property which she 
has possessed at all times and owns. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant, Clearfield State Bank, who was the 
Plaintiff in the Lower Court, will be referred to herein as 
the "BANK" and the Respondent, who was the Defendant in the 
Lower Court, will be referred to herein as the "HUSBAND". 
On or about January 4, 1974, the Bank entered into 
a loan with the husband. A secured agreement was subscribed 
to only by the husband (Pl.Exh.l) and wherein all of the 
household furniture, furnishings, appliances, and other 
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household items were pledged as security and collateral 
for said loan, with the disclosure statement and listing of 
the household items also being signed only by the husband 
CPl.Exh.2) . 
The Appellant-Bank indicated on Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, 
that the items pledged were used for "personal, family or 
household purposes" (Pl.Exh.21. 
The husband advised the Bank, that the items were also 
owned by his wife and that she absolutely refused to sign and 
be a party to the secured transaction and the Bank entered into 
the loan, taking the household items of the husband and wife 
as security, even though the husband advised the Bank that the 
wife had refused to sign, and the loan was concluded even 
though the wife's signature was not obtained or subscribed to 
the loan transaction (R-15). 
The husband further testified, that during the entire 
ten years of the husband's marriage, the wife had been gainfully 
employed for Sperry Rand, Better Business Bureau of Salt Lake, 
a Salt Lake dentist, the Community Credit Counseling in Ogden, 
J. C. Penney1s, and other employers averaging a minimum of 
$3,500.00 per year income over the ten-year period and unemployed 
only during periods of childbirth. (R-15) 
A Petition in Bankruptcy was filed in the United States 
-3-
District Court for the District of Utah, Northern Division, by 
the husband and the Bankruptcy Court disclaimed any interest in 
the security in February, 1975, R-28), which date of Disclaimer 
was subsequent to the filing of the Complaint of the Appellant 
in the Lower Court, and occurred on January, 1975, (R-2), naming 
therein the husband only as a Defendant in the action of the 
Lower Court, which is on appeal before this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHTS OF WIFE CANNOT 
BE DETERMINED AGAINST HER WILL. 
The husband entered into a secured contract with a 
knowledgeable creditor, the Appellant herein, a commercial 
Bank, (R-l,R-3) knowing that the collateral was being used 
for personal, family, or household purposes (R-13). The 
husband had advised the Bank, that the wife was also an 
owner and that she "absolutely refused to sign the secured 
agreement" (R-15) , and the secured transaction was consummated 
as between the husband and Bank with the signature of the 
husband only (R-17). 
The Appellant further had knowledge of the filing 
of the Petition in Bankruptcy by the husband (R-21) and the 
Appellant-Bank brought an action seeking recovery of the home 
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furnishings and personal property of the husband and wife 
naming only the husband as a Defendant therein. 
The Constitution of the State of Utah in Article XXII, 
Section 2 thereof, recognizes the right of every female to 
the ownership of real and personal property, either acquired 
before marriage, or any property to which she may afterwards 
become entitled by purchase, gift, grant, etc., and further 
provides that such property acquired by the female person 
shall be and remain the estate and property of such female 
and shall not be liable for the debts, obligations, or engagements 
of her husband. 
The testimony before the Court evidenced that the 
wife had been employed during the entire ten years of her 
marriage to the husband, except for periods of childbearing, 
and that the monies for the acquisition of the household 
furniture and furnishings came from both the husband and wife, 
together with a loan made from the wife's mother, to acquire 
the household goods (R-15). 
78-23-1 (1 through 14), Utah Code Annotated, as amended 
1953, and as amended laws of Utah 1969, specifically establishes 
the exemption of items of household furniture, furnishings, 
appliances, and other specific goods, and the holding of the 
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Utah Supreme Court in Kimball v. Salisbury, 17 Ut. 381, 53 
P. 1038t can by analogy be applied to Title 78 of the Exemption 
Statute of the State of Utahr wherein the Court held in this 
case, that the exemption conferred by statute is not a privilege 
conferred upon the head of a family/ but an absolute right 
intended to secure and protect exempt property against creditors, 
as a means of support to every family in the State, and it 
is submitted that, therefore, the exemptions provided in Title 78 
should apply to the wife as well as to the husband (Emphasis 
added). 
It is further submitted to the Court, that the analogy 
as between the Homestead Exemption rights and the exemptions 
provided in Title 78 be treated in the same manner as this 
Court held in Panagopulos v. Manning, 69 P.2d 614, Supreme 
Court of Utah (1937), wherein this Court held that the exemptions 
provided under the homestead right is founded on public policy 
and that the statute provides that the homestead shall be 
exempt from Judgment or lien or from execution or for sale 
is remedial, and must be broadly construed to accomplish its 
beneficent purpose. 
This Court has previously stated and has repeatedly 
held, that the homestead right as provided for in 28-1-1, 
Utah Code Annotated, as amended 1953, is founded on public 
policy and is fundamental to in the making of good citizens 
in a free government and is one of the foundation stones upon 
which stability of government rests, and that the statute 
is remedial in order to accomplish its beneficent purpose. 
The citations in support of this view of the Court is found 
in Kimball v. Salisbury, supra; Hansen v. Mauss, 40 Ut. 361, 
121 P. 605? Payson Exchange Saving Bank v. Tietjen, 63 Ut. 
321, 225 P. 598; Utah Builders Supply Company v. Gardiner, 
86 Ut. 250, 39 P.2d 327. It is submitted that there should 
not be a distinction as between the Court's holding in regards 
to the Homestead Exemption Act as against the more life and 
family sustaining exemptions set forth by statute in Title 
78-23-1 (1 through 14), Utah Code Annotated, as amended 1953, 
and as amended laws of Utah 1969). 
POINT II 
WIFE CANNOT BE DEPRIVED OF HER PERSONAL PROPERTY 
WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
The wife is not a Defendant to the action on appeal 
before this Court and was not a party-Defendant in the Lower 
Court. 
The Legislature of Utah, and in whom the Constitution 
vests the exclusive right to enact law, has formerly declared 
in Section 68-3-1, Utah Code Annotated, as amended 1953, that: 
The Common Law of England so far as it is not 
repugnant to or in conflict with the Constitution 
or laws of the United States or the Constitution 
or laws of this State ** is hereby adopted, and 
shall be the rule of decision in all Courts of 
this State. 
In Johnson v. Union Pacific Coal Company, 28 Ut. 146, 
76 P. 1089, the Utah Supreme Court declared that, "the Common 
Law of England" so referred to refers to that law as of the 
date of the Declaration of Independence on July 4, 1776. 
There is no provision of the Utah Constitution nor by 
the statutes of the State of Utah specifically repugnant to an 
estate by the entirety as to the personal property of a husband 
and wife and such estate did exist under the Common Law, as well 
as an estate by the entirety as to real property. 
There are a number of statutory instances wherein the 
Legislature of the State of Utah has enacted statutes which 
makes specific reference to tenancies by the entirety as a 
possible estate and by lending support to the Common Law concept 
of estates by the entirety of both personal and real property. 
In 78-41-1, Utah Code Annotated, as amended 1953, this 
statute makes reference to possible estates existing in the 
State of Utah, and specifically refers to a tenancy by the 
entirety as a possible estate which would be effected by the 
termination of a life estate in reference therein. 
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In 48-1-4(2), Utah Code Annotated, as amended 1953, 
the Statute sets forth the rules for determining the existence 
of a partnership and the type of estate that may exist there-
under, and makes reference to the effect of particular statutes 
as to a tenancy by the entireties. 
27 A.L.R. 826 makes a definition of a marital estate 
and the nature of it is set forth therein as follows: 
An estate of the entirety exists only between husband 
and wife, being an outgrowth of the marital relation 
based upon the theory of the legal unity of the two; 
it is, however, a unit of indivisible parts vest-
ing in two distinct persons Chusband and wife) who 
are, however, regarded in law as one and the same. 
In this regard, the estate differs from a joint 
tenancy. Because of the indivisibility of the 
estate and the fact that it vests absolutely in 
the survivor/ a very serious question has been 
presented as to whether or not any portion of 
the estate may be subjected to the payment of the 
individual debts of one of the spouses. 
An estate by the entirety is a form of co-ownership 
in real and personal property held by husband and wife with 
right of survivorship. Its essential characteristic is that 
each spouse is seized per tout et non per my; that is of the 
whole or one of the entirety and not of a share, moiety, or 
divisible part as was defined in Gasner v. Pierce, 286 Pa. 529, 
134 A. 494; C.I.T. Corporation v. Flint, 333 Pa. 350, 5 A.2d 
126. 
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It is, therefore, submitted to this Court, that the 
Appellant in bringing an action against the Respondent only, 
without including the wife in said action, could not destroy 
the interest of the wife in the household furnishings and no 
possession of the collateral of the property, which was the 
property as much that of the wife as of the Respondent, could 
be achieved and perfected without the wife being a party to 
such action. 
In Louis Licker, et ux, v. Gluskin, 164 N.E. 613, 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the Common 
Law rights and disabilities of both husband and wife attach 
to the interest and title of each arising under a tenancy by 
the entirety, and that the tenancy of the husband and wife in 
the entirety is essentially a tenancy modified by the Common Law 
theory of unity of husband and wife, in that they do not take 
by moieties, but by entireties. The Court further held that 
the characteristic of a tenancy by the entirety at Common Law 
continues unaffected by the modern statutes designed to 
ameliorate the rights of married women at Common Law and to 
render more flexible and individual the property rights of 
husband and wife. The Court further held: 
That these indubitable Common Law rules require 
the conclusion, that a creditor cannot do with 
a right of a tenant by the entirety that which 
the tenant cannot do. 
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It is further submitted to the Court, that the 
Argument of the Appellant as set forth in its Brief before 
this Court and which Argument is based purely upon the 
application of the provisions of the Uniform Commercial 
Code in establishing the rights of the Appellant, was the 
Argument used in the Lower Court and considered by the 
Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde and there is not much more to add 
to his findings, wherein the Court held: 
The evidence indicates, however, that the 
Defendant's wife has an ownership interest in 
the property. The Defendant's wife was not a 
party to the contract. It is not a question 
of priorities of security interest. Defendant's 
wife's ownership interest is superior to 
Plaintiff's security interest. Defendant 
cannot defeat an ownership interest of another 
party by making a warranty of ownership. 
Defendant's warranty of ownership may well 
make the obligation between Plaintiff and 
Defendant non-dischargeable from misrepresen-
tation, however, this Court cannot order him 
to deliver possession of property he does not 
own. Defendant's wife is not a party to the 
contract or to this action, and an Order from 
this Court depriving her of possession of 
property she owns would not be lawful. (R-39) 
In Parry v. Bonneville Irrigation District, 263 P. 
751r Supreme Court of Utah (Jan., 1928), this Court held: 
It is, of course, an elementary rule of law, 
that there can be no judicial action affecting 
vested rights that is not based upon some 
process or notice whereby the interested 
parties are brought within the jurisdiction 
of a judicial tribunal about to render Judament. 
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In Johnson v. Hattram, et aly 275 P. 913, Supreme 
Court of Oregon (1929), the Court held that where there was 
no evidence attempting to show that the wife had any connec-
tion with the transaction out of which the Plaintiff's right 
of action arose, or that her husband was her agent, or had 
authority to transact business for her, that the wife could 
not be jointly liable with the husband in an action for 
money had and received* 
It should be further noted by the Court, that the 
parties are still husband and wife at the time of the action 
and at the present time, and that there has been no evidence 
offered by the Plaintiff to the contrary nor to attempt 
to prove that the husband and wife are living in separate 
establishments. The wife has been in possession of the 
property at all times relative to the matter before the Court, 
and the solution of the Appellant, that the Appellant be 
allowed to obtain possession of the property of the wife with 
the wife having a right to file a suit against her husband for 
a loss suffered by her as provided under Section 70A-9-112 of 
the Commercial Code, is hardly a workable solution to the 
depriving of the wife of her ownership and interest in the 
household furnishings. (App.Br., p.3) 
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CONCLUSION 
It isf therefore, submitted to this Honorable Court, 
that the Judgment of the Lower Court denying to the Appellant 
the right to deprive the wife of possession of property in 
which she has an ownership interest and which consists of 
the household goods purchased by the joint efforts of the 
Respondent-husband and wife, cannot deprive the wife of such 
necessities upon an allegation, that a knowledgeable lender 
undertook to make a loan and seek a security interest against 
the will of the wife upon the basis of an adhesion clause in 
a contract which alleges that the Respondent, by making a 
warranty of ownership, could divest the wife of her title and 
interest to the family household goods• 
Respectfully submitted, 
By ^^^& ^?7' 3 ^ ^ — 
PETE N. VLAHOS', ESQ, , and 
STEPHEN W. FARR, ESQ. 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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